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Abstract: Here, the authors analyse the operator point of view of theWeb-of-Cells concept defined in the EU project ELECTRA,
by identifying operator tasks into the supervision of a highly automated power system, and the information requirements to
facilitate appropriate operator situation awareness. The study outlines the methodology adopted, which is based on the
cognitive work analysis framework, to provide an overview of the most interesting scenarios and to summarise the
requirements analysis results. In order to derive required control room functionality, a set of relevant control room
scenarios have been identified based on the Web-of-Cells control concept. The authors considered scenarios that
challenge traditional control schemes, scenarios that caused major failures (i.e. blackouts), and scenarios that can be
expected to appear in the future. For each scenario, information concerning network layout, triggering events, physical
constraints, manually/automatic operations, operators’ tasks, and relevant analytics have been analysed.
1 Introduction
With the increased ﬂexibility within the power system, system-wide
adoption of dynamic ratings, pervasive control and automation,
increasing market inﬂuence etc., it will remain essential to have
control room operators aware of the system state and of potential
threats, and informed of the actions of automatic control systems.
Considering these encompassing alterations to the system
behaviour and functions, it is recognised that signiﬁcantly
improved information and visualisation tools are fundamental for
future control rooms [1, 2].
The approach adopted in the EU ELECTRA Integrated Research
Programme to deal with power system control is based on the power
transmission and distribution system in the future as a highly
automated web of subsystems, called cells. The cell operators (COs)
have to ensure that the cells maintain their individual agreed schedules
and reserves. For control purposes, a CO has to act on the inner
resources of its own cell and can also cooperate with other COs, in
particular with the neighbouring cells’ COs, so that the whole power
system, the Web-of-Cells (WoC), is stable, secure, and reliable [3].
The control room perspective entails that the overall operation of a
WoC coordinated power system has to be taken into account.
Whereas software/control functions are designed to act on speciﬁc
subobjectives and stability problems from the CO perspective, an
overview of the overall system state has to be addressed.
This paper intends to outline the methodology adopted, which is
based on the cognitive work analysis (CWA) framework [4], to
provide an overview of the most interesting scenarios and to
summarise the requirements analysis results [5].
2 Methodology adopted
The control room perspective entails that the ‘big picture’ of a WoC
coordinated power system operation has to be taken into account.
Whereas software/control solutions are designed with separate
objectives and stability problems in mind, in the CO perspective,
an overview of the overall system state has to be addressed. In
view of the ELECTRA WoC concept, the operator task is to
supervise a highly automated power system’s operation and have
the option and capacity to intervene if necessary [6].
The operator support functions provided in the control room can
be divided into three aspects:
† System monitoring: operator situational awareness (SA); can you
evaluate what is critical right now?
† Supervisory control and interventions: offer input for operator to
adjust system state.
† Decision support: help operator identifying the right intervention.
The design of visualisation and decision support systems for
supervisory control of increasingly automated systems is a
challenge, as increasing automation does not necessarily reduce
the cognitive effort for operators, and in particular in critical
situations, more automated systems have been reported to cause a
higher strain on an operator’s decision-making capacity [7]. In
order to deﬁne detailed requirements for control room solutions,
the designer thus has to understand what constitutes relevant
information to be presented to the operator.
To characterise these requirements for further technical analysis
and design, the main outcome of a further analysis is the
identiﬁcation and prioritisation of this relevant information. To be
able to formulate this information, however, we need to provide a
meaningful context of description and analysis. A systematic
approach to such requirements analysis for human machine
interactions has been developed as Cognitive Systems
Engineering. On this background, an analysis methodology called
‘CWA’ has been applied [8]. CWA offers a stepwise methodology
for systematically identifying and constructing a knowledge
context in which this relevant information can be described.
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Given the speculative and anticipatory setting of the ELECTRA
work, these requirements are hard to identify directly from
interviews with operators, but can be derived and revisited from a
scenario analysis with domain experts instead.
The CWA analysis methodology has been summarised as follows:
[…] the overall approach [consists] of ﬁve interrelated phases of
modelling:
1. The work domain – purpose and structure of the system being
controlled.
2. Activity or control task analysis – what needs to be done in the
work domain.
3. Mental strategies – the mechanisms by which control tasks can be
achieved.
4. Social organisation – who carries out the work and how it is
shared.
5. Worker competencies – the set of constraints associated with the
workers themselves.
In principle there are many speciﬁc modelling techniques that
could serve for each of these phases. […] The CWA
approach therefore provides an interrelated set of
methodologies within which these differing aspects of a
system can be mapped, examined and analysed. For example,
CWA provides a means by which decision making within an
environment can be associated with system goals and
cognitive skills.
Adopting this methodology for the purpose of our analysis,
the ﬁrst step is therefore to describe how the system
(the work domain) ‘looks’ (presents itself) from the operator
point of view: to describe the operating objectives, power
system, and control functions at several levels of detail. In
common CWA practice, the abstraction–decomposition
(Rasmussen’s abstraction hierarchy [9]) space is applied for Step
1, and a hierarchically organised analysis of the operator’s
decision-making (Rasmussen’s decision-ladder [9]) is employed
for Step 2.
A contribution of the ELECTRA project has been to
demonstrate how the presently well-adopted Use Case
methodology can be employed to provide the type of information
required for Step 1: by formulating the required control structures
and functions for the WoC concept in both abstract form
(high-level use cases) and more detailed technical form (detailed
use cases), a clear decomposition of the work domain has been
formulated [10].
To address Step 2 of the CWA methodology (control task
analysis), critical operation scenarios, deﬁned ‘Control Room
Scenarios’, have been identiﬁed and extensively analysed [5].
The elements identiﬁed in each scenario are listed below and can
be related to CWA and SA contexts:
(i) control room scenario name;
(ii) network layout; initial conditions and schedule (domain
context);
(iii) categorisation of scenario (characterisation of scenario
assumptions);
(iv) involved operators and coordination among operators (social
context);
(v) triggering event (starting point of an event sequence; trigger in
decision ladder);
(vi) relevant physical and operational constraints (interpretation
and prioritisation of system state; information analysis/
comprehension);
(vii) initially/automatically affected control loops (use cases;
automatic response/automation);
(viii) grid visualisation (context representation/information
acquisition);
(ix) operator ﬁrst task – awareness of system change of state and
operating state (SA);
(x) operator second task – decision/action (Level 2 SA with
decision and action);
(xi) operator third task – optimisation (Level 3 SA; operator
cooperation with decision support system);
(xii) relevant analytics (e.g. available control capacity from
ﬂexibility resources).
It can be observed that pragmatic simpliﬁcations have been
performed in the formulation of this method. These simpliﬁcations
have been motivated from the perspective that a pragmatic analysis
that is approachable for the project participants will generate more
relevant results than a rigorous analytical approach that has the
risk of alienating the participants. As Endsley and Garland [7]
report, ‘the problem of meaning [ought to] be tackled head on’:
the chosen formulation of the SA and CWA methodology for
scenario analysis offered more signiﬁcance for the project
participants than a pure approach.
This pragmatic approach has been further pursued later in the
work, where the control tasks were analysed in terms of a
sequence analysis, accounting both for required decisions and
analytics and the required information exchange. This control
scenario (control task) analysis is further deepened by a sequence
analysis that includes both operator and control system information
and decision ﬂows. Such an annotated sequence diagram therefore
addresses aspects of Steps 3 and 4 in the CWA methodology
outlined above. An analysis of ‘worker competencies’ (CWA Step
5) has not been considered feasible to address analytically at this
stage.
3 Scenario examples
Three main drivers are identiﬁed for deﬁning the scenarios: scenarios
that challenge traditional control schemes, scenarios that caused
major failures (i.e. blackouts), and scenarios that will happen in
the future (not experienced yet). The interested reader may get the
full picture in [5], while in the present paper, two particularly
interesting scenarios are reported, providing the control room
perspective on the activation of two use cases deﬁned in the
project, namely balance steering control (BSC) and post-primary
voltage control (PPVC) [11]. For each scenario, a brief description
is provided along with the control room perspective.
3.1 Inter-cell loop flows
The electricity market determines solutions for electric power ﬂows
based on the market prices and subsequent bids of participants in the
market. In the WoC concept, automated BSC determines ﬂow
schedules based on the market solution, as these contracted ﬂows
do not necessarily follow physical occurrences and the actual
ﬂows may differ in a meshed grid. Loop ﬂows are therefore
deﬁned as the deviation of the actual power ﬂows from their
scheduled values as described in [12].
Various reasons can cause loop ﬂows, which may not be harmful
per se but may lead to problems when not considered. The two main
factors are insufﬁcient price signals, where market prices do not
reﬂect physical realities and constraints, as well as increasing
energy imbalances due to volatile renewable energy resources that
are increasingly deployed in the grid.
Fig. 1 illustrates various different ﬂow situations in a meshed grid.
The scheduled ﬂow within market participant (cell) A as part of the
market solution is shown in Fig. 1a, whereas Fig. 1b shows the
actual emerging physical ﬂow through neighbouring cells. The
resulting unscheduled ﬂow in Fig. 1c is the difference between
Figs. 1a and b. Loop ﬂows are the parts of the scheduled ﬂow that
take alternative paths as indicated in Fig. 1d. Inter-cell ﬂows are
essentially the same as within a cell, only that now the scheduled
power ﬂow crosses cell borders via tie-lines as demonstrated in
Fig. 1e between cells A and D. The resulting inter-cell loop ﬂow
through cells B and C is given in Fig. 1e.
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Problems related to loop ﬂows are operational security, where
unhandled ﬂows can potentially lead to blackouts, reduced
economic and physical efﬁciency, and increased overall costs due
to contract violations, among others. For this reason, several
mitigating means have been established that allow the control of
ﬂows to a certain extent, such as phase-shifting transformers,
series and shunt compensators etc. In addition, synchronous
machines and HVDC links can be utilised to alter loop ﬂows.
Within ELECTRA, we target for an automated control system that
realises the best possible solution for the scheduled ﬂows under the
given physical constraints. The BSC calculates a physically feasible
solution to the desired market operating points, which is then realised
by the BSC. Real-time monitoring of all production and
consumption together with topological information allows the
control system to react immediately on changing conditions and
steer the grid back to its optimal operating point using available
ﬂexibility resources. Deviations from scheduled ﬂows are therefore
minimised. The remaining permanent deviations should ideally be
fed back into the market and reﬂected in the price signals in order
to mitigate unwanted ﬂows after the next market clearing.
From a control room operator’s point of view, signiﬁcant
deviations from the scheduled ﬂows that do not cease after
balancing actions indicate problems in the automated control
system. These problems may have different causes, such as poor
grid models the control is operating on, corrupted live data streams
within and from other cells, falsely reported operational states of
generators/breakers/etc., among many others that are outside of the
normal operational state. It is therefore the operator’s task to
interpret unscheduled power ﬂows for their potential causes and
take appropriate countermeasures. Sticking to the mentioned
examples, these measures could be contacting other COs to update
the grid models, checking the state of the IT network, sending
technicians on site to observe the actual state of devices etc. In the
case of imminent tie-line overloading, manual override of
generators and loads near the affected line may be necessary to
relieve stress. In all cases, the decision support system should
suggest possible causes and solutions for the unscheduled loop
ﬂows to the operator, who evaluates them and (if applicable)
accepts or refuses the suggested mitigating action.
The premise for the inter-cell loop ﬂow scenario is that the BSC
comes up with tie-line ﬂow schedules that are physically feasible
under normal operating conditions, which are maintained by
automated controllers. Any signiﬁcant deviations from the
schedule therefore indicate problems that are not handled
automatically, for which reason the decision support system should
help the CO to identify the cause of the problem and potentially
suggest solutions.
Fig. 2 illustrates the general scheme for this scenario. The loop
ﬂow algorithm, executed within the cell control centre, observes
the ﬂows in the power grid via the Distributed SCADA system,
which acquires live data from the WoC. If a signiﬁcant deviation
from the scheduled ﬂows is detected, the algorithm enquires
additional grid state information in order to derive the problem
severity and mitigating solutions. If the severity is low, the control
system selects the most appropriate solution and hands it over to
the BSC and/or PPVC as an additional control objective. In the
case of high problem severity, however, the loop properties and
proposed solutions are presented to the human operator, who then
has to interpret and evaluate the facts and request appropriate
countermeasures, if applicable.
3.2 Proactive operation of the voltage control
In the analysis of future provision of ancillary services within
ELECTRA, two control layers were identiﬁed for the fulﬁlment of
voltage control goals: primary voltage control (PVC) and post
primary voltage control (PPVC). Since the PVC will remain
similar to the current practices – even new devices will take
action –, the PPVC will involve radical changes for the WoC
control, monitoring, and operational procedures.
This scenario focuses on the novel strategies to be accomplished
by the CO in the control room for the proactive operation of the
PPVC. The PPVC, working in proactive mode, is intended to
reduce the number of triggers of the PVCs by anticipating the
voltage deviations in the nodes. Based on short-term forecasts and
in 15 min intervals analysis, the CO compares the real-time
voltage measurements with the expected voltages in the nodes.
This way it is possible to correct the voltage deviations in
advance, avoiding unnecessary trips of the PVC.
For the correct operation of the proactive PPVC, the operator in
the control room must have a complete snapshot of:
† the measurements in the WoC, including the voltages in the
nodes, the tie-line power ﬂows, the available PPVC reserves etc.,
† the static information concerning the allowable voltage ranges in
the nodes, the capacities of the lines, or the voltage safe bands for the
nodes.
However, it is also critical to have reliable forecasts (rooted on
generation/load proﬁles) of the short-term voltages in the nodes. In
the case of any bad measurement that could lead to the wrong
operation or even the windup of the control system, the PVC will
act as the automatic backup mechanism.
Summarising the tasks of the operator, the steps to follow in the
operational procedure of the proactive PPVC would be the
following:
Fig. 1 Terms explaining inter-cell loop ﬂows
Fig. 2 Sequence diagram for handling inter-cell loop ﬂows
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† monitoring of the RMS voltage and the voltage deviation in the
nodes,
† calculation of voltage short-term forecasts,
† estimation of the cell state for the following 15 min using
real-time measurements, observables, and short-term forecasts,
† detection of unacceptable deviation of the voltages in any node
with regard to the schedule for the next 15 min,
† proactive activation of the PPVC reserves in accordance.
In Fig. 3, the detailed sequence diagram for the proactive
operation of the PPVC is shown. In it, the main relationships
between actors and elements involved are represented by means of
the information exchanges. The external loop contains the
processes and information exchanges that belong to the continuous
operation of the PPVC in a time horizon of 15 min. The inner
loop actions only take place in the case of a voltage deviation
from the safe band which would imply the recalculation of new
voltage set-points.
The SCADA system managed by the control room operator is
continuously supervising the operation of the WoC. It registers the
measurements, the observables (original ones and those corrected
by the cell state estimation) and also contains the static or
semi-static information of the network (topology, breakers’ status
etc.). On a fully automated basis, the control room operator must
be able to:
† compare the estimated cell state for the 15 min horizon window
with the limit values;
† detect the abnormal condition in any node and launch a proactive
OPF process (if necessary);
† notify the CO and suggest solutions, given the resources available;
† send the new set-points to the local controllers in order to keep the
voltages within the limits established to optimise the system’s power
ﬂows.
4 Conclusions
The scenarios have been compiled to create an overview of possible
situations in future power systems arising under the ELECTRAWoC
approach. The objective of outlining these scenarios has been to
identify speciﬁc requirements for visualisation, analytics, and
decision support. A systematic approach to such requirements
analysis for human machine interactions has been developed as
Cognitive Systems Engineering. On this background, an analysis
methodology called ‘CWA’ has been applied, which offers a
stepwise methodology for systematically identifying and
constructing a knowledge context in which this relevant
information has been described.
Two scenarios, namely ‘inter-cell loop ﬂow’ and ‘proactive
operation of post-primary voltage control’, have been described in
order to clarify the methodology adopted. A cross-sectional
analysis of the above scenarios to reﬂect their coverage with
respect to possible future situations, network levels and topologies,
and the WoC automatic control systems is reported and
subsequently requirements have been drawn.
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